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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Carpenter failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to grand
theft; by relinquishing jurisdiction; or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Carpenter Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Carpenter pled guilty to grand theft of a financial transaction card and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.69-70.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished
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jurisdiction. (R., pp.77-78.) Carpenter filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s
order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.83-88.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.79-80, 110-11.)
Carpenter asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time felon,
acceptance of responsibility and purported remorse, self-reported mental health issues, and his
plan – if placed on probation – to obtain employment, reside at a motel, and “teach young people
Bible study.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
“An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a
clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Bonilla, 161 Idaho 902, 905, 392 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Ct. App.
2017). “To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive, considering any view of the facts.” State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 417 P.3d 1007,
1013 (Ct. App. 2018). The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give
them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 9, 368 P.3d at
629. “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable
sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” Id. at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion
by the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
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The maximum prison sentence for grand theft of a financial transaction card is 14 years.
I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3). The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two
years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.69-70.) Furthermore,
Carpenter’s sentence is appropriate in light of his ongoing disregard for the law, court orders,
and the terms of supervision in the community.
Carpenter began violating the law at a young age – he reported that he began using
marijuana when he was eight years old and methamphetamine at age 10, and that he used both
substances “five or more times a day and was also an intravenous drug user.” (PSI, p.13. 1) He
stated that he “‘got into lots of trouble’” as a youth, and he was eventually placed in a residential
facility that houses juveniles with “behavior issues,” where he “‘grew up in [his] middle teens.’”
(PSI, pp.9-10, 26.) He advised that “‘they let [him] out’” in June 2013, after he “‘turned 18,’”
and that he has been homeless “‘ever since,’” claiming that he “travels by jumping on railroad
cars” and that he has lived in Kentucky, Texas, Indiana, Arkansas, Washington, Oregon, and
Idaho. (PSI, pp.5, 9-10, 26.)
Carpenter “moved to Idaho” “with his Aunt” in 2013 or 2014. (PSI, pp.8, 10-11, 52; R.,
p.35.)

In November 2014, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and

possession of drug paraphernalia and was placed on probation. (PSI, p.8.) Carpenter stated that
he “‘was homeless for about 3 ½ weeks,’” and he was working at Miller’s Food City when he
committed the instant offense in May 2016, during which he rummaged through a coworker’s
belongings in the employee break room and stole a debit card out of the coworker’s wallet. (PSI,
p.7; R., p.20.) Although Carpenter claimed that he felt “really bad” for committing the instant
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Appeal Volume 2
Confidential Documents 9-6-2018 17.50.50 12759819 27630868-CCE8-4B0B-B7708FBAFFEEE7D0.pdf.”
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offense, his remorse did not preclude him from continuing to violate the law – he committed the
new crime of failure to purchase/invalid driver’s license less than one week later. (PSI, p.8.) He
subsequently failed to appear for his arraignment in this case and a warrant was issued for his
arrest. (R., p.3.)
Carpenter was arrested on the warrant in July 2016 and was later released on his own
recognizance – with the conditions that he submit proof of “work search” and check in with the
Public Defender’s Office three times per week – at which time the court “gave him a long lecture
about being a man of his word and showing up [for] the court hearings.” (R., pp.3, 35, 38, 51.)
Carpenter nevertheless failed to comply with the conditions of his release and again failed to
appear for court hearings in August and September 2016, and the court eventually issued a
second warrant for his arrest. (R., pp.51-52; 5/11/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-11.)
Carpenter was arrested on the second warrant on October 31, 2016, and thereafter
remained in custody until his guilty plea hearing in January 2017, at which time the court again
granted him release on his own recognizance with the condition that he report to the probation
office. (R., pp.7, 59-60, 63.) The court specifically cautioned Carpenter, “If you don’t show up
this goes very badly against you.” (R., p.60.) Despite this warning, Carpenter failed to appear
for both his presentence interview and his sentencing hearing, and the court issued a third
warrant for his arrest. (R., pp.64-65.) As a result of his multiple failures to appear, Carpenter
was not sentenced in this case until May 11, 2017 – a full year after he committed the instant
offense. (PSI, p.7; R., pp.67-68.)
At sentencing, the state argued:
Judge, when we look for someone as a good candidate for probation,
we’re looking for someone who adheres to court orders, who perhaps has some
support in the community, something set up to be successful, and that’s not what
we see here. My understanding is he has perhaps a job in place; however, he’s
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had a couple jobs in place, Judge, that lasted, I believe based on [his counsel’s]
corrections, a few weeks, maybe.
And so at this point, I believe he’s not a good candidate for probation at
all, Judge, and a rider would provide him with the skills to be successful, to make
some decision-making to -- some better decisions and have the appropriate tools
to do well on probation.
(5/11/17 Tr., p.8, L.14 – p.9, L.1.) The district court likewise concluded that Carpenter was not
an appropriate candidate for probation, stating:
There was at least -- well, there was at least three warrants went out in this case.
The Court can’t abide by just you just ignoring the law. And I do understand that
you have issues and that life has been hard for you. But when the Court gives you
a specific instruction not to do something and to show up when you’re supposed
to and gives you the chance to be out and you don’t do it, there’s got to be
consequences.
(5/11/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-22; p.14, Ls.12-13.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a reasonable
sentence. Carpenter’s sentence is appropriate in light of his continuing disregard for the law and
his refusal to abide by court orders or the terms of his pretrial release. Given any reasonable
view of the facts, Carpenter has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and retaining jurisdiction.
Carpenter next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction because his counsel requested a second rider, Carpenter apologized for “taking up so
much of [the district court’s] time,” and because – although his performance in his assigned
programming was “negative” and he declined to attend the “psycho-social groups” while on his
rider – he “maintained mental health medication compliance.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.) The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
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248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be
deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet,
155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154 Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing
State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001)).
On appeal, Carpenter argues that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction in part because, at the jurisdictional review hearing, his trial counsel requested a
second rider. (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) The district court addressed this request, noting that it
“only ha[d] four months left” out of the 365 days that it was authorized – pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 19-2601(4) – to retain jurisdiction, and concluding, “That’s not enough to do another
satisfactory rider.” (1/12/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-18.) Furthermore, I.C. § 19-2601(4) prohibits
successive periods of retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation. State v.
Flores, 162 Idaho 298, 302, 396 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2017) (“[A] district court may order additional
periods of retained jurisdiction only ‘after a defendant has been placed on probation[.]’” (quoting
I.C. § 19-2601(4)).
Carpenter also argues, on appeal, the district court should not have relinquished
jurisdiction because he was diagnosed with schizophrenia upon arriving at ISCI – based on
symptoms of “audible hallucinations, paranoia, mood swings, depression, and anxiety” (PSI,
p.45) – and he thereafter “maintained mental health medication compliance” while on his rider
(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9). However, the mental health examination report that was completed
before sentencing diagnosed Carpenter only with “Stimulant Use Disorder - Amphetamine Type,
Mild - Sustained Remission,” with a provisional diagnosis of “Unspecified Personality Disorder”
(PSI, p.30), and the psychological evaluation that was completed after Carpenter finished his
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rider diagnosed Carpenter only with “Malingering,” with a rule-out diagnosis of Antisocial
Personality Disorder (PSI, p.57). The psychological evaluator reported that Carpenter’s response
pattern on psychological testing was “invalid” and that Carpenter “was considered to be
volitionally exaggerating his presentation of mental health symptoms, for secondary gain.” (PSI,
pp.56-57.) The evaluator concluded that Carpenter did not appear to be motivated for treatment
and that:
Carpenter’s apparent maladaptive personality disorder includes traits
characterized by deceitfulness and disregard for social norms. Given the
pervasive nature of this disorder, it may be considered that he will retain an
elevated risk for misrepresentation and noncompliance, which elevates his risk of
recidivism in violating legal standards.
(PSI, p.58.)

Carpenter’s malingering, continued elevated risk to reoffend, and lack of

amenability to treatment does not suggest that he is a suitable candidate for probation.
Furthermore, Carpenter performed abysmally on his rider, incurring corrective actions
and/or incident reports for “talking disrespectfully toward staff,” “refusing orders,” and several
incidents wherein he “was not within policy of the institution and interfered with count.” (PSI,
pp.42, 47-48.) More than two months after he arrived at the rider facility, Carpenter “request[ed]
to relinquish” because he “isn’t interested in programming,” “it would be easier to do his full
time,” and he “doesn’t want to do probation.” (PSI, pp.41, 47-48.) Although he later changed
his mind and completed his assigned programming, he performed poorly and his case manager
reported:
From the beginning, the facilitator commented, “Mr. Carpenter was resistant to
treatment at the beginning of class, stating he did not have a behavioral problem
because he was not the one who started conflicts with others, they started conflicts
with him. He was unwilling to recognize that his reactions to situations led him to
being in trouble in most conflict situations.” Mr. Carpenter’s behavior was also
an issue in class and shows reflection of his acceptance to treatment[:] “Mr.
Carpenter was very disruptive to the class. He constantly initiated cross-talk and
would interrupt role plays with peers and the facilitator by making derogatory
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remarks to the role players. He would often discuss topics that were not
appropriate to the class material and would become agitated when redirected by
the facilitator. On more than one occasion he has told the facilitator in front of his
peers that he ‘hates’ the class and it is a ‘stupid class’ and that he will ‘never use
this stuff in real life.’” Part of the programming curriculum is to practice the
skills with peers. The facilitator commented, “He did not put much effort into the
class and skill role plays. He made up stories about having a girlfriend and a
child, neither of which are true, and based every role play and homework
assignment off of them. When his peers would do role plays, he would interrupt
them and attempt to speak for them in their role plays. He would not set up role
plays to have a prosocial outcome and encouraged his peers to engage in criminal
behaviors during role plays.” The facilitator took note when he said, “I can avoid
trouble by absconding.” The facilitator noted in her summary that, Mr. Carpenter
made it clear he did not care about the risk of coming back to prison, he does what
he wants.
(PSI, p.43.) Rider staff recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, stating, “We
believe at this time that Mr. Carpenter is not amenable to treatment and is still a safety risk to the
community. While Mr. Carpenter completed Thinking for a Change there is not sufficient
progress and learning to be successful in the community and on supervision at this time.” (PSI,
p.44.)
At the jurisdictional review hearing, the district court stated, “Mr. Carpenter, you didn’t
make much of an effort at your retained jurisdiction. You discounted everything they were
trying to do for you in that retained jurisdiction.” (1/12/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.10-13.) The district
court reasonably determined that Carpenter was not a viable candidate for probation, particularly
in light of his demonstrated disregard for the law, court orders, the terms of pretrial release, and
institutional rules, and his failure to make sufficient rehabilitative progress while on his rider and
the continued risk he presents to the community. Carpenter has failed to establish that the
district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.
Finally, Carpenter asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion for a reduction of sentence because he claimed that “his statement that he could avoid
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trouble by absconding” was an example of negative thinking and because he “informed the
district court that, if he could not get back to Kentucky after leaving prison, he was set up to live
in a halfway house in Meridian.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) If a sentence is within applicable
statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this
court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho,
201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Carpenter must “show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Carpenter has failed to satisfy his burden.
Carpenter did not provide any “new” information in support of his Rule 35 motion.
Information with respect to Carpenter having a housing plan was before the district court at the
time of sentencing.

(5/11/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-14.)

Information with respect to Carpenter’s

statement, while on his rider, that he could “‘avoid trouble by absconding’” was contained in the
APSI, and Carpenter was provided the opportunity – both by rider staff and by the district court
before it relinquished jurisdiction – to provide any explanatory comments and/or information;
however, he chose not to do so. (PSI, pp.43-44; 1/12/18 Tr., p.20, L.22 – p.21, L.1.) Rule 35
functions to allow a defendant to request leniency in light of “new or additional” information that
was not available at the time of the prior sentencing decision, not to allow a defendant to
withhold information that was previously available so that he can later present it as “new” for the
purpose of a Rule 35 motion. Because Carpenter presented no new evidence in support of his
Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having
failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
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Even if the information Carpenter provided was considered “new,” he has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. At the hearing on Carpenter’s Rule 35 motion, the district court
articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for
declining to reduce Carpenter’s sentence. (6/4/18 Tr., p.11, L.10 – p.14, L.12 (Appendix A).)
The state submits that Carpenter has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his Rule 35 motion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
Rule hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Carpenter’s conviction and sentence
and the district court’s orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Carpenter’s Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 28th day of February, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of February, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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